Denver Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 3

Article 2

January 1963

One Year Review of Constitutional Law
Morton Gitelman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Morton Gitelman, One Year Review of Constitutional Law, 40 Denv. L. Ctr. J. 134 (1963).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XL

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By

MORTON GITELMAN*

One function of the highest appellate court, be it state or federal, is to resolve with some degree of finality those troublesome
questions created by societal progress. By substituting an appellate
court for some other method of resolving the issues that beset a
society, in opposition to a legislative, executive, or administrative
solution, at least two things are accomplished - some meaning is
given to the concept of "rule of law" and the high courts are constantly exposed to a barrage of criticism.
Any state court of last resort which undertakes to rule on a
question having political overtones or a question presenting a dramatic and divisive constitutional issue is bound to suffer the slings
and arrows of public criticism. Recalling the observation of an
English reporter, "At the first sound of a new argument over the
United States Constitution and its interpretation the hearts of
Americans leap with a fearful joy. The blood stirs powerfully in
their veins and a new lustre brightens their eyes. Like King Harry's
men before Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining upon the start."'
The United States Supreme Court has, over the years, developed
a resilient skin, relatively impervious to missiles fired by the public.
The Colorado Supreme Court and other state courts are, in contrast,
much more vulnerable to public criticism. Consequently, constitutional issues may, at times, be approached with reluctance, or trepidation, or misgiving. Thus, in the broad view, little consistency can
be seen in2 the Colorado court's approach to similar constitutional
problems.
The Colorado Supreme Court has had, in the context of the above
discussion, a difficult year. In four cases the court was faced with
constitutional problems, the resolution of which inevitably created
public criticism. Rather than rake up old editorial coals, the following discussion of the four "big" cases in 1962 will review the court's
approach and method. Some of the other important or interesting
cases will be discussed in the second part of this review and the
minor constitutional law cases will be summarized in Part III.
I.
The four most publicized constitutional law
Colorado court in 1962 dealt with the diverse and
of raising funds for metropolitan improvements,3
portionment, 4 non-discrimination in employment, 5

decisions of the
serious problems
legislative reapand non-discrim-

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 The Economist, May 10, 1952, p. 370. Quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Steel Seizure
case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952).
2 For example, compare the court's approach in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Continental Air Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962) with Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1962). Both cases will be discussed, infra.
3 Four-County Metro. Capital Imp. Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 369 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1962).
4 In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
5 Colorado Anti-Discriminotion Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962).
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ination in housing." The members of the court,
understandably,
7
were not in agreement in any one of the cases.
A. Metropolitan Improvements
Early in 1962 the Colorado court was faced with the problem of
determining the validity of a legislative scheme for providing metropolitan capital improvements through a sales and use tax imposed
throughout a metropolitan district (MCID).8 The statute involved
in the case was a legislative attempt to solve the problem, relatively
new in Colorado, created by metropolitan growth.!) Briefly, the
problem centers about the accommodation of the interests of a city,
legally limited by its boundaries, with the interests of people located in surrounding governmental units, physically indistinguishable from the city.
As a metropolitan area grows in size, capital improvements
within the city limits tend to inure to the benefit of suburban residents as well as to the inhabitants of the city. For example, a city
government may feel impelled to relieve traffic congestion caused
by "rush hour" travels of suburbanites oscillating between jobs in
the city and homes outside the city. Thus, a street-widening project
may benefit the suburban travelers more than city residents living
in an opposite corner of the city. As the costs of such improvements
increase and the amount of available revenue decreases (due in
part to the exodus of middle and upper class families to the suburbs) the financing of capital improvements within the city inevitably grows more difficult.
In one sense, the difficulties alluded to above are due to the
highly artificial and usually anachronistic legal lines drawn about
cities. One side effect of increased urbanization is the unnecessary
duplication of governmental units; because of an invisible legal line
drawn down the center of a street, people require two police departments, two fire departments, two sanitation departments, two
school districts, two city governments. These governmental services
are constantly costing more, local taxes are increasing, and, anomalously, the need for such services is decreasing in the sense of wasteful metropolitan duplication, triplication, or even great multiplication.
In essence, then, the problem posed by the MCID case was
whether the state legislature could constitutionally provide a
method for multi-government participation in local capital improvements. The legislative purpose, as reflected in Section 1 of
the act is particularly illuminating:
• . . The general assembly hereby finds . . . that local
governmental units within the metropolitan areas of this
state have common problems and needs which transcend
6 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1962).
7 In the four cases, a total of fifteen opinions were reported.
In the Metropolitan Capitol
Improvement District case, note 3, supra, Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion, Justice Sutton
concurred specially and Justice McWilliams dissented; Justice Moore also wrote on opinion on the
petition for rehearing. In the Reapportionment case, note 4, supra, Chief Justice Day wrote the
majority opinion, Justice Sutton concurred specially, Justice Moore dissented (joined by Justice
Frantz) and Justice Hall dissented. In the Continental Air Lines case, note 5, supra, Justice Moore
wrote the majority opinion, Justice Frantz dissented (joined by Justice McWilliams) and Justice
Pringle dissented. In the Case case. note 6, supra, Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion, Justice
Frantz concurred specially, Justice Pringle concurred specially and Justice Hall dissented.
8 Note 3, supra.
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179.
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the boundaries of such local governmental units; that as
metropolitan areas become urbanized the need for capital
improvements increases at an accelerated rate; that modern
means of communication and transportation and the attendant mobility of population have transformed metropolitan areas into homogeneous areas in which ease of movement is an absolute necessity and in which capital improvements must be geared to the needs of the entire area; that
capital improvements in any part of a metropolitan area
inure to the benefit of the entire area, as well as to the people of the state; and that there is need for coordination of
overall planning, financing and construction of capital im-

TEN
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" OR your automatic washer for well over a month
SMALL WONDER WE SAY ELECTRICITY IS STILL
YOUR BIGGEST BARGAIN IN MODERN LIVING
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
an investor-owned utility

XL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1963

provements and for the acquisition of capital equipment in
order to enable local governmental units to cope with the
problems of urbanization and to provide the means by
which the planning, acquisition, construction and financing
thereof may be accomplished. To these ends the provisions
of this act shall be liberally construed. 10
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the act was unconstitutional in that the state legislature did not have the power to delegate the authority to do the things set forth in the act. The unlawful
powers delegated by the legislature to the administering agency
were held to be the power to levy and collect a sales and use tax
throughout the established multi-county district,1 ' the power to
decide which proposed capital improvement projects should be carried out,"' and the power to vest title to the completed projects in
the various participating governmental units.1"
The court viewed the statutory district as an unconstitutional
interference with the powers allocated to local governments by
article XX of the Colorado Constitution. One feature of the statutory provisions that irritated the court especially was the "conduit"
nature of the district:
It is indisputably clear that the district is a conduit through
which to channel taxes earmarked for local "capital improvement" or "capital equipment" in the county or city
areas where collected ....
Indisputably the district becomes
a conduit, created by statute, through which activity is
channelled to accomplish objectives which for generations
have been achieved by local officers directly responsible to
the people, and upon whom the duty of discharging such
local responsibilities has heretofore been placed by constitutional provision
or municipal home rule charter provi14
sion, or both.
Unfortunately, the court never tells us why a "conduit" is such a
venal legislative device. The approbative connotation is even less
understandable when one realizes that almost every administrative
agency, state or federal, serves as a "conduit."
Specifically, the court felt that the district was created and
authorized to accomplish objectives which article XX of the constitution placed in the sole jurisdiction of home rule cities. Article XX
states in part that the City and County of Denver has the power
...within or without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct and operate, water works, light plants, power
plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any
other public utilities or works or ways local in use or extent, in whole or in part, and everything required therefor,
for the use of said city and county and the inhabitants
thereof .... 5
The court reasoned that since article XX gave home rule cities
all the powers necessary in regard to capital improvements, the
10 Ibid.
Colo.
'Colo.

11
1
13
14
15

Sess. Laws
Sess. Laws
Colo. Sess. Lows
Note 8, supro at
Colo. Const. art.

1961,
1961,
1961,
71.
XX, §

ch. 179,
14 at 552.
ch. 179, § 13(5) at 551.
ch. 179, § 19 at 555.
1.
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legislature had no powers left to delegate. 16 To substantiate this
reasoning the court pointed to the advertised plans of the district
for Denver capital improvements which included branch libraries,
street widening, parks, swimming pools, boating facilities, a fire
station and maintenance equipment. 17 These activities fall within
the realm of "official functions of home rule cities with relation to
local and municipal affairs,"' ' and, therefore, can be exercised only
by home rule cities.
One difficulty with this reasoning is simply that although each
home rule city within a metropolitan area has the power under
article XX to provide for its own "capital improvement" needs, it
may not have the means to do so in the absence of some supramunicipal method of financing, such as an area-wide sales and use
tax. The point which the court never really comes to grips with is:
What is so invidious about multi-municipal cooperation to solve
metropolitan problems? This is the heart of the matter.
Perhaps the answer to the above question can be found in the
method provided by the legislature for creating and running the
district. The creation of a district was conditioned upon a petition"
filed in a district court,'2 a judicial hearing and findings 21 and a
judicially ordered and controlled election. 2 If a majority of the
votes cast were in favor of creating the district, the district was
authorized by a district court decree. 2 3 Looking at what actually
occurred in the Denver area, one can readily discern the flaw in the
act-in each of the counties surrounding Denver the voters rejected
the district but enough voters in Denver cast affirmative ballots,
thus authorizing the district by a majority of the total votes cast. 4
In addition, the act provided that the Board of Directors of the dis-5
trict could contain, up to one half of the board, Denver directors."
Obviously, the court could have invalidated the act on the basis
that, mechanically, it allowed a large city, such as Denver, to cause
the creation of a district without the approval of the suburban citizenry. If the act had contained safeguards against such a possibility,
e.g., requiring approval of a majority of the voters in each county
of the proposed district, one would be hard pressed to find any
justification for the court's decision. In other words, the court
should have based its decision upon the last mentioned grounds
rather than upon article XX prohibiting the legislative delegation
of power. If the court had followed this suggestion, it would not
have gotten into the question of special improvement districts.
When the decision was first announced many people were concerned that the court was impliedly disapproving of all types of
16" . . . it has been made perfectly clear that when the people adopted Article XX they
conferred every power theretofore possessed by the legislature to authorize municipalities to
function in local and municipal affairs . . . . In the area of providing local 'capital improvements'
and 'capital equipment' in the cities, the General Assembly had nothing to give in the way of
power or authority to any new superstructure of government encompassing multiple counties and
numerous towns and cities." Note 8, supra at 72 (emphasis in original).
17 Id. at 73.
18 Ibid.
19 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § ,5 at 546.
20 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 6 at 546.
21 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, 4§ 7, 8, 9 at 546.
22 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179,
10 at 547.
23 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 11 at 548
24 The court, interestingly enough, took judicial notice of these occurrences but hardly emphosized
them. Note 8, supra at 70.
25 Cola. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 179, § 12(3) at 549.
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multi-governmental special improvement districts such as water,
sewage, and sanitation districts. On the petition for rehearing, the
court explained that "improvement districts" were still valid and
distinguished metropolitan capital improvement districts:
In matters which are not local and municipal and are
particular projects which cannot be handled by the immediate area in which the physical installation is located ....
or where water conservation will benefit a large area ....
or where cooperative effort between areas extending beyond municipal or county lines is essential with references
to a particular project in sanitation affecting the public
area, an "improvement district" is perhealth of the entire
6
fectly proper.2

In distinguishing the two kinds of districts, several factors were
emphasized:
1. Valid "improvement districts" finance improvements by a
mill levy on real property to be benefited by the improvement rather than a sales tax.
2. After completion of the capital improvement project, title
was to be conveyed to the local unit involved, rather than
being retained and managed by the district.
3. Qualifications of the directors under the statute were designed to protect certain local rather than district-wide interests.
4. The district would be authorized to acquire personal property.
Justice McWilliams, in his dissenting opinion, could see no difference between the metropolitan capital improvement district and
other improvement districts. His opinion is based heavily upon the
case approving27the improvement district created to construct the
Moffat Tunnel.
By choosing to ground its decision upon article XX of the Colorado constitution, the court is using a provision intended to grant
powers to municipalities for the purpose of restricting the legislature's power to provide solutions for metropolitan problems. If
municipalities can cooperate and do together what each could do
apart,28 and if the legislature can create a supra-municipal improve'
ment district which taxes real property located within the district, 2
then the MCID decision is explainable, not because of the limitations of article XX, but because the statutory method provided for
creating and managing the proposed district smacks of allowing
large cities to initiate a district against the will of suburbanites.
Although the only precedent value of the MCID case is to perhaps create a brake on legislative zeal, 3 the court's result might
have been more palatable to the dissenting portion of the public had
it been based upon the invalidity of the particular statute rather
than upon a holding that the legislature has no power to deal with
anything that judicial interpretation might place within the ambit
of article XX.
26 Note 8, supra at 77.
27 Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 Pac. 649 (1922).
28 See McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 37.04.
29 See note 27, supra.
3It0The court does not purport to lay down any general principles in the sense
indeed the case may be viewed by attorneys as being limited to its peculiar facts.

of precedent;
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B. Legislative Reapportionment
In March, 1962, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Baker v. Carr,31 holding that malapportionment of a state
legislature which denies some voters equal protection of the laws
gives rise to a justiciable controversy open to judicial consideration.
This decision literally "opened the floodgates." By August, 1962,
four states had been reapportioned and court actions or legislative
action was pending in twenty-five other states.3 2- In February, 1963,
it was reported that "Lawsuits [on reapportionment] have been
filed in at least 35 states, and in 18 states there have been judicial
decisions holding the33 existing legislative apportionment of one or
both houses invalid."
Soon after Baker v. Carr removed the bar of "nonjusticiable
political question" from reapportionment suits, 3 4 an original proceeding was filed in the Colorado Supreme Court seeking a writ
requiring the General Assembly to reapportion. 35 The suit was directed at the Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, and the General Assembly. The petition sought the following relief: 1. An
order requiring the Governor to call the legislature into special
session for purposes of reapportionment; 2. An order enjoining the
Secretary of State from carrying out an election under the allegedly
invalid apportionment act; 3. An order enjoining the Treasurer
from paying legislators salaries under the existing apportionment
act; and 4. An order requiring the General Assembly to reapportion.
The first action taken by the Colorado court was to discharge
the rule against the Governor, Secretary of State, and Treasurer.
The court said ". . . we cannot and will not command the Governor
to do anything, the doing of which lies within his sound discretion,
and we deem his authority to call the Legislature into special session to be such prerogative. ' 36 This aspect of the decision is hardly
startling and is entirely consistent with constitutional history.3 7 As
31 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32 N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1962, § E, p. 5.
33 Jewell, Reapportionment and the Courts, The New Republic, Feb. 2, 1963, p. 17.
34 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Also see Part IV of the majority opinion in
Baker v. Carr, note 31, supra.
:l5In re Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962).
-16 Id. at 67. The court cited Veto Power, etc., 9 Colo. 642, 21 Pac. 477 (1886), a per curiam
decision stating, inter alia,"Whether or not an occasion exists of such extraordinary character as
demands a convention of the general assembly in special session . . . is a matter resting entirely
in the iudgment of the executive."
:37 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 437 (1866); 2 Warren, The Supreme Court
in United States History 462 (Rev. ed. 1928).
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to the other executive officers, the court held their duties to be be-yond the court's reach in so far as the duties involved are imposed
on the officers
by the constitution or not given to them by the con38
stitution.
Turning next to the question of jurisdiction. over the subject
matter, the court felt bound by Baker v. Carr and quoted approvingly from a recent New Jersey reapportionment case:
If by reason of passage of time and changing conditions the
reapportionment statute no longer serves its original purpose of securing to the voter the full constitutional value
of his franchise, and the legislative branch fails to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of the courts must be
open to him. 9
The court then proceeded to dispose of the petition by the
amazing feat of interpreting the state constitution so as to find the
1963 General Assembly "the session next following" the 1960 United
States census. The constitution provides that the general assembly
shall revise the apportionment "at the session next following an
enumeration made by the authority of the United States.

' 40

A "rea-

sonable interpretation"'" of this provision results in the following
analysis:
1. The 1961 General Assembly was not the session next following the 1960 census because the session was "for all practical
purposes" over by the time the official certification of the
enumeration was available.
2. The 1961 extraordinary session can not be counted because
it was called "especially to correct some school finance legislation."
3. The 1962 General Assembly does not count because there
were no even-numbered annual sessions at the time article
V, § 45, was embodied in the constitution and, further, because even-year sessions are limited to fiscal matters and
subjects designated by the Governor.
4. Therefore, the 1963 General Assembly is the session next
following the 1960 enumeration! "We hold that we can
and
' '4
must await the action of the 44th General Assembly.

2

Two reasons are apparent to explain the court's reluctance to
grant relief. First, the necessary remedy, ordering the 1962 elections
to be held at large, seemed unworkable to the court and perhaps
more mischievous than another year or two of malapportionment.
Second, at the time the petition was filed, several proposals for constitutional amendments were being aired, 44: and the court felt it
should not act until both the legislature and the people have failed
to reapportion:
We believe there should be no judicial intrusion into the
legislative and executive affairs of the state, and we should
38 Note 35, supra at 67.
39Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 11, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
40 Colo. Const. art.

V, § 45.

41 Note 35, supra at 69. Why did the court refuse to interpret art. XX of the constitution
"reasonably" in the MCID case?
42 Id. at 70.
43 Two amendments appeared on the November, 1962, election ballot and Amendment 7, the
so-called Federal Plan, was adopted by the voters. The constitutionality of this amendment was
litigated before a three-judge federal court and the validity upheld in a 2-1 decision.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XL

be ever mindful of the necessity of preserving the integrity
and independence of the coordinate branches of government. We should, therefore, exercise an appropriate degree
of restraint to see if they will carry out their duties. Only
if both they and the people fail to act will it become a judi44
cial function to step into the void.
As a result, article V, § 45, of the constitution now requires the
general assembly to reapportion at some session after the United
States census with such duty becoming mandatory only after the
people have failed to invoke the initiative and referendum powers.
Finally, the court entered an order retaining jurisdiction "until
either a constiutional amendment has been passed by the voters in
November, 1962, or until the 44th General Assembly in its 1963 session has had an opportunity to act in the matter ....-45 This retention of jurisdiction has presumably expired of its own terms because of the constitutional amendment adopted in November, 1962.
Justice Moore dissented, urging:
In the case before us the petitioner is entitled to equal protection of the law-NOW! .... That which deprives a citizen of this "equal protection" must be swept aside and held
for naught, even though it be an act of the general assem46
bly or a provision of the state constitution!
Justice Moore felt the proper remedy to be an at-large election.
Justice Hall also dissented, disagreeing with both the majority
and Justice Moore, on the ground that the judiciary had no power
to grant appropriate relief in malapportionment cases:
The powers and duties of the Supreme Court are limited,
well defined by the Constitution and enabling legislation.
I find nothing therein remotely suggesting that this court
has the power to step in and fill the breach occasioned by
the failure of the executive or legislative branches of the
government to perform their constitutional duties.4 7
Justice Hall would have dismissed the petition with no retention
of jurisdiction.
A similar suit, seeking an injunction to enjoin enforcement of
the offensive apportionment statutes, was pending in the federal
courts at the time of the Colorado Supreme Court suit discussed
above. The three-judge federal court also withheld judgment pending the 1962 elections and retained jurisdiction until after the election, ordering a pre-trial conference "on or about November 15,
1962.1148

C. Discrimination in Employment
The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 19571) makes it an
unfair employment practice "For an employer to refuse to hire, to
discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of
44 Note 35, supra at 71.
45 Id. at 72.
46 Id. at 76-77. Compare Justice Moore's language in the MCID case: "Any who seek to persuade
this court to emasculate this constitutional provision [art. XX] by judicial fiat, are doomed to disappointment. To nullify constitutional safeguards for the sake of expediency in solving local problems of Home Rule Cities . . . would establish a precedent contrary to all precepts of constitutional
government .....
" Four-County Metro. Capital Imp. Dist, v. Board of County Comm'rs, 369 P.2d
67, 77 (Colo. 1962).
47 Note 35, supra at 83.
48 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 1962).
49 Cola. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp. 1960).
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compensation against any person otherwise qualified, because of
race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry."5 After a hearing,
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission found that Continental Air Lines had violated the act by denying employment to an
otherwise qualified Negro applicant for a job as airline pilot. Continental sought judicial review. 5' The district court, Judge Black,
held that the act could not be constitutionally applied to Continental because of its position as an interstate air carrier, and that application of the act would constitute a burden on interstate commerce.5
The commission and complainant sought reversal of the district
court judgment by writ of error in the Colorado
Supreme Court.
53
The supreme court affirmed the district court.
In reaching the conclusion that the Colorado Act could not be
applied to an interstate air carrier, the court relied on three United
v. Board of Wardens,54 Hall v.
States Supreme Court cases, Cooley
5
DeCuir,5 and Morgan v. Virginia. 6

The Cooley case established the broad proposition that states
are prohibited, under the commerce clause, from regulating those
areas of interstate commerce which by their nature require uniform
treatment. The Hall and Morgan cases apply that principle in situations of racial discrimination by interstate carriers.
In Hall, a Louisiana statute prohibited discrimination in passenger accommodations and a Mississippi statute required segregation. The defendant, owner of a steamship plying between the two
states, was sued for denying a Negro equal accommodations. The
Supreme Court held the Louisiana statute invalid:
Uniformity in the regulations by which he [the interstate
carrier] is to be governed from one end to the other of his
route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative
power of determining
57
what such regulations shall be.

In the Morgan case, a Virginia statute requiring segregation on
all passenger motor vehicles was held unconstitutional when challenged by an interstate passenger. The test was stated thusly:
There is a recognized abstract principle . . . that may be

taken as a postulate for testing whether particular state
legislation in the absence of action by Congress is beyond
state power. This is that the state legislation is invalid if
it unduly burdens that commerce in matters where uniformity is necessary-necessary in the constitutional sense
of useful in accomplishing a permitted purpose. Where uniformity is essential for the functioning of commerce, a state
may not interpose its local regulation. 58
50 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-6(2) (Supp. 1960).
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-24-8(1) (Supp. 1960): "Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be
aggrieved by a final order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain
judicial review thereof ....
"
52 Continental Air Lines v. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, Denver Dist. Ct., B-29648,
Jan. 7, 1961.
53 Colorado Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 368 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1962).
54 53 U.S. (12 How.) 996 (1851).
55 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
56 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
57 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 547, 548 (1877).
58 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946).
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Applying these authorities to the case at bar, the Colorado court
concluded that the state was powerless to legislate concerning racial
discrimination by employers engaged in interstate commerce: "The
Supreme Court of the United States has clearly indicated that with
reference to interstate carriers the regulation of racial discrimination is a matter in which there is a 'need for national uniformity,'
and that the states are without jurisdiction to act in that area." 59
Justice Frantz dissented in a lengthy, well-documented opinion.
In essence, the most persuasive reasons for his dissent were the
ideas that employment contracts are not commerce and can thus
be regulated by the states under their police power, and that state
anti-discrimination statutes aid rather than burden commerce in
fulfilling the requirements of the 14th amendment.
Justice Pringle wrote a separate dissent, which can be summed
up in the following extract:
• . .I cannot believe that a law passed by a state which
implements a basic concept of our form of governmentthe right of a man, otherwise well qualified, not to be
denied a job solely because of his race, color or creed-can
60
be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October
8, 1962,61 and on April 22, 1963, handed down a.unanimous opinion
reversing the Colorado court.6 2 Mr. Justice Black wrote for the
Court and held, in effect, that the Colorado court had misread the
Hall and Morgan cases. Those cases are distinguisable upon the
theory that they involved situations where the interstate carriers
were exposed to inconsistent legislation in different states; the burden on interstate commerce arose out of the hazard of conflicting
state treatment.o3 In the instant case, however, the Court felt that
enforcement of Colorado's anti-discrimination act would not expose,
and indeed could not expose, Continental to conflicting statutes in
other states; in other words, no other state could compel the employer to behave contrary to the order issued by the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Commission. Therefore, reasoned the Court, this is
59 Note 53, supro at 974-75.
60 Id. at 982 (emphasis in original).
61 Colorado Anti-Discritn. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 83 S.Ct. 26 (1962).
62 Colorado Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 83 S.Ct. 1022 (1963).
63 This is the approach taken in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), where the
Court held that a new safety device (contour mud-flaps on large trucks) out of line with the requirements imposed by other states (which required straight mud-flaps) may place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
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not a case requiring uniformity among states in the sense of Cooley,
Hall and Morgan.
D. Discrimination in Housing
The Colorado Fair Housing Act of 195964 makes it unlawful
For any person having the right of ownership, or possession, or the right of transfer, rental, or lease of any housing: 6 5 To refuse to transfer, rent, or lease, or otherwise to
deny or to withhold from any person or persons such housing because of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or
ancestry; to discriminate against any person because of
race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry in the
terms, conditions, or privileges pertaining to any housing,
or the transfer, rental, or lease thereof, or in the furnishing
of facilities or services in connection therewith; to cause to
be made any written or oral inquiry or record concerning
the race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry of a
person seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing.6 6
The validity of this and other provisions of the fair housing act
into question in Colorado Anti-DiscriminationComm'n
were called
67
v. Case.

In the Case case, a Negro couple answered a newspaper advertisement for sale of a home in Colorado Springs, inserted by the
owner who was a real estate broker. After visiting the property and
giving the salesman a $500 deposit, the Negroes were informed by
an employee of the broker that they would be unhappy in that
neighborhood. When the Negroes insisted on purchasing the house,
they were told it had been sold; actually the house was conveyed to
one of the broker's salesman who subsequently resold the house to
a white purchaser.
The commission found, after hearing, that an unfair housing
practice had been committed and ordered the respondent real estate
firm to offer the complainants a comparable home in the same or a
comparable neighborhood. Upon review in the district court,lis that
portion of the act authorizing the commission to enter the order it
did was held unconstitutional as being vague and indefinite and an
unlawful delegation of legislative power. 69
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. . 69-7-1 to -7 (Supp. 1960).
65 "Housing" is defined in the act to " . . . mean any building, structure, or port thereof which
is used or occupied . . . as the home or residence of one or more human beings; or any vacant
land for sale or lease; but does not include Premises maintained by the owner or lessee as the
household of his family with or 3without domestic servants and not more than four boarders or
lodgers." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7- (c) (Supp. 1960). The meaning of this definition is unclear (and
uninterpreted); apparently, it is intended to exempt from the act those property owners who rent
out rooms in their homes, so long as less than four boarders ore taken in.
66 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-5(I)(b) (Supp. 1960). The act goes on to establish other unfair housing
practices of a similar vein in connection with financing
and advertising housing and inserting
9
restrictive covenants in real estate instruments. §§ 6 -7-5(I)(c), (d), (e), (f). Subsection (2) carves
out an exception for religious organizations which gives preferences to members of the religious
denomination. § 69-7-5(2). This subsection is obviously designed to exempt nursing homes, sanitoria,
old peoples' homes, etc., operated by religious bodies. In this connection, the provision must be
read along with § 69-7-3(b) defining "person."
67 380 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1963). The case was decided on December 17, 1962, and rehearing denied
April 8, 1963. The author felt it was more important to include the case in the 1962 review while
it is still fresh.
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-7(1) (Supp. 1960). The wording of this section is exactly the same as
in note 51, supro.
69 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 69-7-6(12) (Supp. 1960): "If, upon all of the evidence at a hearing, the
commission shall find that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair housing
practice . . . the commission shall . . . issue . . . an order requiring such respondent to cease and
desist from such unfair housing practice and to take such affirmative action, including (but not
limited to) the transfer, rental, or lease of housing; the making of reports as to the manner of
compliance and such other action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate the purposes
of this article."
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The supreme court discussed first the validity of the fair housing act in light of the contention that the act takes property without
due process 70 and takes private property for private use in violation
of article II, § 14, of the Colorado Constitution. The court upheld
the act as a valid exercise of the police power, balancing the property rights asserted by the real estate firm with the human rights
asserted by the complainants. The court held that the ninth amendment to the United States Constitution buttressed by the Colorado
Constitution, article I, §§ 3 and 28, establish inherent and inalienable human rights superior to property rights which have never
been regarded as absolute. 1
The court bases its decision, then, on a theory of natural rights
-the right of an individual to acquire and possess property free
from racial or religious discrimination far outweighs any right,
claimed to be "inherent," of a property owner to discriminate in the
transfer of his property to anyone he sees fit. Although it is unusual
for a court to talk in terms of inherent rights, an analysis of the
two concepts, "private property" and "police power" shows that
they are often in conflict in the sense that almost every exercise of
the "police power" results in an uncompensated burden on private
property. As was so well stated so long ago by Professor Ely:
Now there is more in this police power than regulation
of property relations and contractual relations. But there
is no difficulty except where property and economic relations are concerned. No one objects to general benevolence
-to doing good without cost-so when we consider police
power, its essence is the interpretation of property, and
when we consider the real essence of the police power as
found in the leading American decisions we find that it is
consistent with this concept. It is that power of the courts
committed to them by American Constitutions whereby
they must shape property and contract to existing social
conditions by settling the question of how far social regulations may, without compensation, impose burdens on prop72
erty.
The court answered the contention that the act takes private property for private use without compensation, a taking prohibited by
article II, § 14, of the state constitution, by pointing out that the act
only comes into operation once the owner of the property, of his
own free will, places the property on the open market.
After establishing the validity of the fair housing act under the
state police power, the court turned to the problem of whether
§ 6 (12) of the act 73 amounts to an unlawful delegation of legislative
power. The court held that the portion of § 6(12) empowering the
commission to take "such other action as in the judgment of the
commission will effectuate the purposes of this article" did amount
70 In violation of the

fourteenth amendment

§ 25 of the Colorado Constitution.

to the United

States Constitution and article II,

71 The court quoted from Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934): " ...
But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest."
72 1 Ely, Property and Contract in Their Relation to the Distribution of Wealth 220 (1914)
(emphasis in original).
73 See note 69, supra.
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to an unlawful delegation: "The legislature cannot delegate to any
administrative agency 'carte blanche' authority to impose sanctions
7 4
or penalties for violation of the substantive portion of a statute.
Presumably, the result of this holding is that the commission
may order the transfer, rental or leasing of housing, but is powerless to fashion any other remedies. This holding is perhaps consonant with other Colorado cases 75 but seems out of line when
viewed in light of most modern decisions in other states, and under
federal law. More and more states today are following the federal
view of delegations to administrative agencies and holding that
such delegations are valid if intelligible standards are set forth to
guide the agency in exercising its discretion. 7 6 The Colorado legislature certainly gave the commission a standard in § 6 (12) -"such
action . .

.

as will effectuate the purposes" of the act 7"

A majority of the court, then, upheld the fair housing act in
ringing terms78 but limited the power of the Anti-Discrimination
Commission to fashion remedies appropriate to correction of unfair
housing practices. This feature of the case is perhaps the most difficult to appreciate as one so rarely sees judicial liberalism and
judicial conservatism so emphatically displayed in the same opinion.
On the one hand, the court talks in terms of "natural rights" and
ascribes to the legislature the valid and laudable purpose of saving
the nation from tyranny while, on the other hand, the court invokes
the delegation doctrine in all of its fictitious majesty and says only
the legislature can detail the remedies to be applied under the act.
Justices Frantz and Pringle concurred specially, in separate
opinions. Justice Frantz used his opinion to indicate that the fair
housing act is in line with Colorado's historical role of liberalism
in questions of race and color:
Our pronouncement this day is on the side of history.
What we have here said is in harmony with eternal principles to which the founding fathers pledged fealty in
simple, noble language in the Declaration of Independence.
For it is historical fact that Colorado's
statehood marks the
7
first fulfillment of these principles.
Justice Pringle in his concurrence indicated his belief that even
though the commission is now limited under § 6 (12) to ordering
the transfer, rental or lease of housing, an order may be entered
requiring a respondent to procure "comparable housing in the same
or in a comparable neighborhood" in those cases where there is
evidence in the record to substantiate the availability of comparable
housing.
74 Note 67, supra at 43.
75 See, e.g., Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).
76 For an excellent discussion of the delegation problem, see Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 560 (1947).
77 Compare this language with the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which authorized the
Administrator to establish prices which "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and
will effectuate the purposes of this Act." This delegation was upheld in Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (19").
78 E.g., "When, as at present, the entire world is engulfed in a struggle to determine whether
the American concept of freedom with equality of opportunity shall survive . . . we would be
blind to stark realities if we should hold that the public sofety and the welfare of this notion
were not being protected by the Act in question. Indeed, whether the struggle is won or lost
might well depend upon the ability of our people to attain the objectives which the Act in question
is designed to serve." Note 67, supra at 41-42.
79 Id. at 43. Justice Frantz went on to point out that the spirit of the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments was embodied in the Enabling Act creating the State of Colorado and that
the constitution of the new state reflected this spirit.
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Justice Hall dissented, believing the entire act unconstitutional
as in direct violation of article II, § 14, of the state constitution,
"Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner." Justice Hall first pointed out that other states
with fair housing acts limit the application of the statute to publicly
assisted housing; only Massachusetts applies its statute to all housing8 ° and that state has no constitutional provision like article II,
§ 14. Then he indicated that the effect of enforcing the fair housing
act would be to divest the owner of the property of his title and
place title in the complainants. "Such a result, in my humble opi80 Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1962).
New York, on April 22, 1963, extended its statute to cover private housing, effective September 1,
1963.
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nion, would constitute a 'taking of property in a constitutional
sense' and in flagrant violation of article II, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado." '
II.
In the four cases just discussed, the court was subjected to extensive public criticism. However, in four other constitutional law
cases the court handed down opinions on fairly important questions
with little publicity attending the pronouncements. These four cases
will be discussed here.
A. Real Estate Taxes and JudicialReview
In Mardi, Inc. v. City and County of Denver,s-2 the court invalidated a statute requiring payment of assessed property taxes as a
condition precedent to judicial challenge of the correctness of the
assessment.
The City and County of Denver assessed plaintiffs' property,
Cherry Creek Shopping Center, in 1958. The plaintiffs objected to
the assessment; after hearings, the Board of Equalization denied the
petitions for reduction in the amount of assessment. The denial was
by means of written notice dated December 31, 1958, and received
by the plaintiffs on Friday, January 2, 1959. Upon appeal to the
district court, the decision was for the defendant because of plaintiffs' failure to comply with the statutory provision," . . . before the

appeal to the district court shall be allowed, the petitioners shall
pay to the county treasurer
the amount of the tax levied pursuant
8 3
to such assessment.

The Colorado Supreme Court was, on appeal, faced with the
question of whether the above statute requires or can require payment of taxes levied under a contested assessment as a condition
precedent to the district court's jurisdiction. The supreme court
found that the requirement of § 38 is void as an "invidious and unwarranted distinction
not countenanced by constitutional require4
ments of equality.

Because another statute provides that "all taxes shall be due
and payable, one-half on or before the last day of February, and the
remainder on or before the last day of July of the year following
the one in which they were assessed," 'S the court found protesting
taxpayers are discriminated against in having to pay all the assessed
taxes prior to their district court appeal,," while non-protesters need
not pay until the end of February and July.
The courts holding-that § 38 is discriminatory and void because of no justifiable basis for the prepayment requirement-displays an unfortunate application of constitutional principles. Assuming the correctness of the result, the court, by invalidating the
statute, used a solid club rather than a flexible birch rod in achieving that result. Whether or not it is reasonable to require payment
of taxes prior to judicial challenge of the assessment, is primarily
81 Note 67, supra at 48. Justice Hall went on to say that "Winking at clear constitutional provisions and giving judicial sanction to unlimited expansion of the police powers may well be
Forerunners of a police state." Ibid.
82 375 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1962).
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
84 Note 82, supro at 685.
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-9-3 (1953).
86 Protesters must appeal by the first Monday in January. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
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a legislative question, i.e., the legislature has the power to prescribe
conditions precedent to using the courts for judicial determination
of tax problems. In the Mardi case, however, the court is using an
equal protection theory because of discrimination between two dissimilar classes-protesting and non-protesting taxpayers. This injudicious use of equal protection notions and of heavy-handed statute voiding are especially indefensible because another theory was
available to the court for achieving the same result.
The court pointed out, in the Mardi case, that the plaintiffs had
only one day in which to prepare their district court appeal because
they were notified of the rejection of their administrative appeal
on January 2, a Friday, and the statute required filing of the appeal
by the first Monday of January. This, the court said in a dictum,
"can be scarcely deemed to be due process of law, or fair."8 Thus,
the court could have decided that these plaintiffs were denied due
process, or that the statute as applied to them imposed an unconstitutional requirement, instead of abstractly deciding that the statute
is void on its face because some class other than the one utilizing
the statute is treated differently!
B. Annexations
When the City of Denver annexes territory of an adjacent county, must this annexation be approved by a majority of voters in the
entire county affected? The Colorado court, in Board of County
8
Comm'rs v. City and County of Denver,"
said such approval need
not be obtained.
The Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County
sought judicial review 9 on behalf of the residents of the county and
in their individual capacities to challenge two annexations of Jefferson County territory. The basis for the challenge was that the
provisions 0 allowing Denver to annex territory of other counties
without submitting the question to all the voters in that county
constitute a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
The supreme court carefully analyzed the equal protection
argument 9 ' and decided first that the county commissioners in their
official capacity could not avail themselves of fourteenth amendment protection, on the theory that92"subdivisions of a state government cannot challenge state action.
The court then decided that the county commissioners, in their
individual capacities, were not denied equal protection. This part
of the decision is based on the Supreme Court case of Hunter v.
Pittsburgh)' 3 holding that citizens have no vested right, in the constitutional sense, in municipal boundaries.
The county commissioners, in this case, tried to depict the annexation provisions as allowing the City of Denver to encroach upon
the territory of surrounding counties at will, upsetting county tax
87 Note 82, supra at 683.
88 372 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1962), appeal dismissed, 82 S.Ct. 679 (1963).
89 Under the provisions of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-6 (1963).
90 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 1. Also see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-3 (1953).
91 Compare the court's approach in this case with the loose language in the Mardi case discussed
in the previous section of this article. The variation in approach is even less understandable when
one notes that the two opinions were written by the same justice.
92 The court relied on Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36 (1933), holding that a municipal corpora.
tion has no privileges and immunities under the fourteenth amendment.
93 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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planning and altering intra-county districts. This depiction was rejected by the court:
Annexations to Denver . . . are the product of the free
choice of the majority of statutorily authorized persons in
the district seeking annexation. The City Council of Denver
does not initiate the annexation proceedings; it merely accepts or rejects the annexation 94petition presented, subject
to other statutory requirements.
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.9"
C. Zoning
Board of County Comm'rs of Jefferson County v. Shaffer96 involved a challenge of a zoning classification resulting in a supreme
court decision which clearly sets forth the role of the judiciary in
zoning cases.
In the Shaffer case, the county zoned the plaintiffs' property
R-2, residential; petitions to change the zoning classification were
denied, and a suit was brought alleging that the zoning resolution
as applied to the plaintiffs was confiscatory, discriminating, unreasonable and, therefore, violative of the equal protection and due
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial
court granted relief and issued decrees which, inter alia, rezoned
the property in question.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its powers in substituting its judicial judgment for that of
the zoning agency. The courts cannot interfere with the discretion
vested in the zoning body except where there is a clear showing of
an abuse of that discretion and, further, where the question is
merely debatable no abuse of discretion exists. In reviewing the
instant record, the court emphasized the following principles:
1. The fact that property might be more valuable in a
commercial use than in a residential use is not sufficient
in and of itself to upset a zoning ordinance establishing
the property as residential.
2. The fact that adjoining streets are redesigned to carry
a heavy flow of traffic (thus greatly increasing the commercial value of the property and decreasing its residential value) is insufficient to establish the unreasonableness of the residential classification.
3. Unless there is a showing that the property cannot be
used for the purposes limited in the zoning ordinance,
one cannot establish an abuse of the zoning agency's discretion in denying a change of classification.
The court's decision is based on the feeling that a court is not
equipped to engage in the business of zoning and that for a court
to substitute its judgment as to the correct zoning classification of
a particular piece of property would result in more harm than good
because of the evils of spot zoning. Consequently, so long as there
94 Note 88, supra at

157.

95 82 S.Ct. 679 (1963).
96 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1962). The principles underlying this decision were reaffirmed in City
and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 374 P.2d 357 (Colo. 1962). Also see Baum v. City and
County of Denver, 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
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is some evidence to support the zoning authority's classification, it
will be upheld.
The import of this decision lies in the notice given by the court
that the only way to upset a zoning classification judicially is to
show a clear abuse of discretion. Furthermore, a showing that the
property is more valuable in another use will not satisfy the abuse
of discretion requirement so long as some evidence exists that the
property can be used for purposes consistent with the zoning
agency's classification.
D. Unemployment Compensation
In Donnell v. Industrial Comm'n,9 7 the court upheld the statute
authorizing the commission to use its discretion in denying jobless
pay for voluntary quits. The statute provides that ". . . if an individual ... has quit his job without good cause and without extenuating
circumstances, he shall be disqualified for not less than ten weeks
nor more than thirty-two and one-half weeks ... as determined by
the department in each case according to the circumstances or seriousness of the act or offense ...."98
In the Donnell case, a woman quit her job after a salary dispute
with the employer. Upon applying for benefits she was awarded
compensation with a twenty-two week disqualification. The employer appealed on the ground that the former employee was not
entitled to any benefits. The supreme court held the statute consti97 368 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1962).
98 Colo. Rev. Stat. §

82 4 9

- - (l)(c) and (d)

(Supp. 1960).
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tutional on the basis of a former decision involving the same wording in a predecessor statute.1 9
This decision was the impetus for proposed legislation in the
General Assembly to amend the statute and eliminate compensation for those who quit their jobs voluntarily. As of this writing,
no such legislation has been passed. Although unemployment compensation statutes in many states provide total disqualification for
voluntary quits, 100 good words can be said for the Colorado approach, in that the statute recognizes the difficulty of defining accurately "good cause" and "unemployed through no fault of his
own" and leaves to the department the task of assessing the degree
of "fault" which attached to the voluntary quit. 1 1
III.
Several other cases involving constitutional law issues were
decided by the court in 1962. Because of the relatively minor significance of the constitutional law decisions in these cases, they will
merely be digested here.
0
In Goldy v. Gerber,1
2 the court decided, among other things,
that the business of conducting an industrial bank could be regulated and even prohibited under the police power of the state.
McCarty v. Goldstein'03 upheld the validity of the two year statute of limitations for malpractice actions against doctors, chiropractors, osteopaths, chiropodists, midwives and dentists. The statute had been challenged as violative of equal protection because
other practitioners of healing arts, such as nurses and psychologists,
were not included. The court held that "The classification of occupations and professions for limitation and regulation is a matter for
legislative determination, and when based upon
reasonable grounds
04
will not be interfered with by the judiciary.'
In Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game and Fish Comm'n,'0 5 the
court held that a priority to use of water constitutes a property
right which is protected under the eminent domain provisions of
the state constitution.
Whether the non-exercise of a special power of appointment in
Colorado, thus passing the assets of a New York trust in accordance
with the trust, creates a taxable transfer in Colorado was decided
in People v. Cooke. 10 6 In that case, a trust was created by decedent's
mother in Connecticut in 1931, the trustee and trust assets located
in New York; decedent was designated an income beneficiary for
life with a general power of appointment. In 1949, decedent in New
Jersey reduced her general power to a special power; in 1956 decedent became domiciled in Colorado and in 1957 she executed a
will providing that it was not her intent to exercise the special
power. After decedent's death, Colorado sought to include the trust
assets in the estate for inheritance tax purposes. The executor challenged such inclusion on constitutional grounds. The Colorado court
99 Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558, 342 P.2d 1016 (1959).
100 E.g., Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act § 601 B: "An individual who has left work
voluntarily without good cause . . . shall be ineligible for benefits ....
.
101 See Teple, Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit, 10 Ohio St. L.J.
191 (1949); Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 Yale L.J. 147 (1945).
102377 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1962).
103 376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
104 Id. at 693.
105 369 P.2d 557 (Colo. 1962).
106 370 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1962).
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held that, for tax purposes, a special power of appointment could
constitutionally be treated as a general power:
... a general power of appointment, exercised or non-exercised, is a proper foundation upon which to impose a succession tax, even though the intangible assets are located
in a state other than that where the
person possessing the
10 7
power of appointment is domiciled.
In Peters v. People,10 the court decided two constitutional law
points. First, the court held that the larceny by bailee provision of
the criminal code10 9 is not vague and indefinite in the constitutional
sense of informing men of common intelligence of its meaning and
application. 110 Second, the court stated its understanding of Mapp
v. Ohio:"'
We conclude that the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States went no farther than to exclude in the state
courts the use of evidence obtained by way of an unreasonable search and seizure as forbidden by the Fourth Amendment ....
It does not exclude all evidence which might be
obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest, nor does it preclude the admission of all evidence which may have been
obtained without the sanction of a search warrant [such as
a permissive search] .112
The court, in Bunzel v. City of Golden,"'3 upheld a city ordinance imposing a very high license fee upon "operators" of coinoperated amusement games and a relatively low license fee for
"dealers." The court held that the business of operating pinball machines is not "inherently useful or harmless" and thus may be regulated without regard to fourteenth amendment arguments. This
conclusion was based on the statute authorizing cities to prohibit
or suppress gaming devices 1 4 and a 1936 decision holding that pinball machines are gaming devices within the statute.115
In Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. State,16 the court held that
the state constitution, article IX, § § 9 and 10, gives the state board
of land commissioners the power to control public lands and this
power encompasses the granting of mineral leases without prior
approval of other state agencies.
117
Finally, in May Stores Shopping Centers, Inc. v. Shoemaker,
the court, in invalidating the method utilized to assess shopping
center property (the assessor based the determination on a comparison with a "model shopping center" located elsewhere in the
city), held that hearings before the Board of Equalization" S are
107 Id. at 899. The reason for treating a general or a special power (non-exercised) the same
is that in either case the trust beneficiaries receive their bounty by the inaction of the decedent.
Id. at 900.
108 376 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1962).
109 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-14 (1953): "If any bailee, by finding or otherwise of any money,
bank bill, or note, or goods or chattels, shall convert the same to his own use with an intent to
steal the same, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny in the same manner as if the original taking
has [sic] been felonious, and on conviction thereof shall be punished accordingly."
110 See e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
111 367 U.S. 643 (1962).
112 Note 108, supra at 175.
113 372 P.2d 161 (Colo. 1962).
114 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1(66) (1953).
115 Walker v. Begole, 99 Colo. 471, 63 P.2d 1224 (1936).
116 368 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1962).
117 376 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1962).
118 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 137-3-38 (1953).
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quasi-judicial; thus due process requires a full adversary type hearing and no use of extra-record evidence.
IV.
In attempting to summarize the work of the Colorado court in
constitutional law cases the difficult task is to find a common thread
running through the major cases. The only effective and constructive criticism lies in examining the court's approach to constitutional
cases and, unfortunately, the Colorado court's approach in 1962 was
so varied and so inconsistent that, in effect, no approach can be discerned. One expects differing approaches from different justices
but how can
one deal with very different approaches from the same
justice?'" )
One conclusion, then, is inescapable-the court and the individual justices have not developed a consistent, philosophically based
approach to constitutional problems. Rather, the methodology is
intensely casuistic. This is, perhaps, undesirable from the point of
view of the practitioner who would like to predict the outcome of
his case. However, one finds the same phenomenon operating in
connection with most state supreme courts. The reason is, in part,
due to the type of work performed by the state appellate courts.
Constitutional problems are only one part, and a small one at that,
of the workload of the Colorado court. Thus the court does not have
the opportunity to develop an approach to constitutional problems
as does the United States Supreme Court.
The question thus becomes whether one can expect the justices
to do more than react to the immediate issues before them. Perhaps
the only practical way to answer the question is to express a hope
that the members of the court will more carefully consider the language of their opinions in light of what they
have expressed in
20
prior opinions involving constitutional issues.1
-

119 See notes 2, 41, 46, 91, supro, and accompanying text.
120 This comment is in no way intended to reflect upon the results reached
only upon the methods and language used in arriving at those results.
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